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             NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-3459
RAFAEL DANIEL DE LA CRUZ-JIMENEZ,
Appellant
v.
RONNIE HOLT
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-1304
(Honorable A. Richard Caputo)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 28, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 30, 2008)
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
Rafael Daniel De La Cruz-Jimenez appeals from an order of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his petition for a
     1 On March 1, 2003, the INS’s functions were transferred to the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and the U.S. Customs and Immigration
Service (“USCIS”) of the United States Department of Homeland Security.  See Knapik
v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 86 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).
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writ of mandamus.  We will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which gives
district courts authority to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a court’s mandamus decision for abuse of discretion, but we
review non-discretionary elements de novo.  Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir.
1996).  We note that “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that can only be granted
where a legal duty ‘is positively commanded and so plainly prescribed as to be free from
doubt.’”  Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Com’n v. O’Leary, 93 F.3d
103, 112 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Harmon Cove Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh, 815
F.2d 949, 951 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
Cruz is serving a prison sentence at the United States Penitentiary, Canaan, for a
criminal conviction.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service (which has been
succeeded by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement) lodged a detainer
against him, as an investigation had been initiated to determine whether Cruz was subject
to removal from the country.1  
     2 Because the District Court dismissed the petition without a response, we, like the
District Court, will not reach the issue of whether Cruz exhausted his administrative
remedies.  We note, however, based on the documents in the record, that it does not
appear that Cruz exhausted administrative remedies, and the petition also could have been
dismissed on that basis.
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Cruz, who disputes that a detainer has been lodged against him, filed a “Petition
for a Writ of Mandamus or in the alternative, Writ of Prohibition,” in the District Court. 
Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that Cruz believes that the document labeled
“Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action,” which is attached to his petition (page 18 of
53), is not a detainer, but instead is simply a “notice.”  His petition further demands that if
the prison has a detainer, it must serve him with it.  His petition asks, in the alternative,
that if the Court finds that the detainer was a “detainer warrant and not a detainer notice,”
that it construe his petition as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and consider his
claim that his due process rights were violated because the detainer had been kept
“secret.”
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court is to dismiss a case at any time,
if, as is the case here, it finds that the case fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.2  We can discern no legal duty that the prison warden owes Cruz regarding the
immigration detainer.  The prison provided Cruz with a copy of the detainer; it is attached
to his mandamus petition.  It may be that Cruz does not believe that the document should
be construed as a detainer, but that is not the proper subject of a writ of mandamus.  Cruz
also appears to claim that the prison owes him a duty under the Privacy Act, allegedly
     3 Cruz does not appear to contest the District Court’s alternative holding that to the
extent the petition is construed as a habeas petition, it is without merit.  If we were to
reach the issue, we would agree that the detainer is not sufficient to place Cruz in ICE
custody.  And, to the extent the petition raises a due process argument based on Cruz’s
classification within the prison, it also fails, as he does not allege any atypical or
significant hardship on the basis of his classification.  See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
468 (1983); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 (1995).
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because it failed to maintain an accurate record concerning him.  As the Appellee
properly argues, the extraordinary relief of mandamus would not be available in this
regard, as another remedy would be available, namely, an action under the Privacy Act
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a.  Further, we note that the allegations of Cruz’s petition do
not demonstrate that the prison failed to maintain an accurate record; rather, it appears
that his allegations of inaccuracy are based solely on his contention that the document
captioned “Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action” is not a detainer.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal.3
